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Abstract
One of the negative side effects of the consumer society and the increasing number of consumer goods 
available to the average household is the intransparency of product quality, especially product lifetime. 
There are many examples on failing products and premature obsolescence. Often this phenomenon is relat-
ed to companies’ profit maximization strategies (planned obsolescence) and consumer protection policy is 
mobilized to stop this type of exploitation. The paper applies micro-economic analysis to discuss the prob-
lem of optimal product quality (e.g. lifetime) in terms of cost-benefit-analysis and under imperfect informa-
tion (based on Akerlof ’s lemon problem). Given consumers’ actual willingness to pay there is an optimal 
quality which is lower than the technically possible. If the innovation perspective (Schumpeter’s “creative 
destruction”) is added to the analysis, increasing global competition and speed of product innovation are 
identified as core drivers for shorter product lifecycles and tend to be the actual limiting factor of product 
lifetime (economic vs. technical obsolescence). Even if the goals of sustainable development are included in 
the analysis, this does not provide an unambiguous argument for long-life products as new products tend to 
be more eco-efficient. A broader discussion on optimal quality (lifetime) of products is necessary, based on 
holistic life-cycle assessment of alternative product quality options. And finally: The tendency of increas-
ing aftersales disappointment of consumers’ expectations and conflicts with sustainable development goals 
need to be addressed in a more general debate on (limits of ) consumerism. Minor changes in the laws for 
protecting consumers (e.g. longer warranty) will not do the job. 
Keywords: Obsolescence, innovation, quality competition, imperfect information, sustainable develop-
ment, life-cycle analysis 
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1. Introduction: Problem, State of the Art and 
Method
One of the negative side effects of the consumer so-
ciety and the increasing number of consumer goods 
available to private households is the intranspar-
ency of product quality, especially product lifetime. 
There are many examples (anecdotal evidence) of 
failing products and premature obsolescence, in-
cluding electric toothbrushes, washing machines 
and printers. Often this phenomenon is related to 
companies’ profit maximization strategies (planned 
obsolescence) and consumer protection policy is 
mobilized to stop this type of exploitation. It seems 
to bother more and more consumers and tends 
to become an obstacle for consumerism. Nobody 
wants to be fooled permanently or wants to invest 
significant chunks of lifetime for investigating pro-
ducers’ quality promises. In some contrast to popu-
lar media contributions and publications (Schridde, 
2014, Slade, 2006) there are only few empirical stud-
ies and hard facts which prove the significance of 
premature obsolescence (Prakash et al., 2015). We 
do not strive to provide any empirical evidence but 
take the phenomenon as given.
In a more formal way we can formulate the problem 
of premature obsolescence, i.e. (too) short technical 
product lifetime T as follows:
(1) T < technically possible
(2) T < customers’ expectations 
(3) T < “sustainable” (long-life products which 
would avoid resource consumption)
(4) τ < T  actual economic lifetime τ is even shorter 
than the technical lifetime.
In the economic theory we are used to focusing 
on price and quantity, implicitly assuming a given 
quality. In the standard microeconomic textbook 
by Varian (2014: 738-741) we find only four pages 
on quality, referring to Akerlof ’s (1970) used car 
market model and adding another one (on um-
brellas) which includes companies’ optimal pro-
duction decision and determines an “equilibrium 
quality”. However, no efforts are made to further 
specify (good) quality, e.g. the lifetime of a car or 
an umbrella1. Different from this mainstream is 
Schumpeter (1911) who did not focus on (minor) 
differences in quality but on (major) discontinuous 
changes. These innovations “do not as a rule take 
place in such a way that first wants arise spontane-
ously in consumers and then the productive appara-
tus swings round through their pressure.” “It is the 
producer who as a rule initiates economic change, 
and consumers are educated by him if necessary; 
they are … taught to want new things, or things 
which differ … from those which they have been 
in habit of using” (Schumpeter 1911: 65). While 
in Schumpeter’s analysis producers define prod-
ucts (including quality) and consumers’ needs and 
tastes are “given”, there is another strand of litera-
ture which critically analyses this side of the market 
(Veblen, 1899; Scitovsky, 1976) – but did not enter 
mainstream economics. No attempts have been 
made so far to integrate these perspectives and to 
relate them to the more recent debate on sustain-
able development. 
In this paper we transfer and apply the available the-
oretical components to investigate some economic 
aspects of product quality focusing on product life-
time and durability. What could economics con-
tribute to explaining the (perceived) discrepancy 
between consumers’ expectations on quality (dura-
bility, lifetime) and the actual, unsatisfactory qual-
ity which is delivered by industry? In our analysis 
we first apply basic microeconomics to discuss the 
problem of optimal product quality (e.g. lifetime) in 
terms of cost-benefit-analysis. We then analyse the 
implications of imperfect asymmetric information 
- based on Akerlof ’s lemon problem. In the next 
analytical step we add the innovation perspective 
(Schumpeter’s “creative destruction”) to the analysis 
and accelerated product innovation is identified as 
core driver of shorter product lifecycles (economic 
vs. technical obsolescence). We then ask how sus-
tainable development goals influence quality deci-
sions. Does this normative context support high-
quality, long-life products and thus also contribute 
to overcome consumers’ frustration? 
Based on these aspects of theoretical analysis we 
ask what role government could play in address-
ing the premature obsolescence problem, especially 
whether forms of regulation would be justified. We 
end by considering some perspectives and probable 
limitations for (product) innovation and acceler-
ated “fashions” – given the challenges of sustain-
able development. This raises primarily questions 
for the individual consumer and his sophisticated 
consumption patterns. But it might also have some 
implications for industry and new dimensions for 
the consumer protection policy. 
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2. Optimal Product Lifetime  
Higher product quality is related with higher costs. 
With the degree of perfection (reliability, durabil-
ity, long-life) costs normally even tend to increase 
disproportionally, i.e. we face increasing marginal 
cost. On the other hand, consumers’ benefit of an 
additional increase in quality will decrease the more 
“perfect” a product already is (declining marginal 
benefit). If this well-known argumentation holds2, 
we face the following optimization situation:
Figure 1 Optimal Quality 
Source: Author
It is then possible to determine an optimal level of 
quality – given production cost (technology) and 
consumer preferences or willingness to pay. It is 
clear that this economic optimum is not using the 
maximum of the technological potential. Compa-
nies should produce only the quality which is cov-
ered by consumers’ willingness to pay. If quality 
is persistently lower than optimal (e.g. as a conse-
quence of monopoly power), society suffers a wel-
fare loss as illustrated in Figure 1. A higher level of 
quality (i.e. marginal cost > marginal benefit) would 
also reduce economic efficiency (welfare). 
The interesting point now is whether markets will 
converge towards such equilibrium – or if rather a 
“benevolent dictator” is needed. For companies it 
could be attractive to offer lower quality (shorter 
lifetime) as this would c.p. (ceteris paribus) reduce 
their costs and increase revenues. However, this will 
work only if and as long as consumers’ are imper-
fectly informed. 
To sum up: In an efficient (welfare maximizing) 
economy there is an optimal quality (life-time) 
which is lower than the technically possible. This 
optimum can be perceived as (too) “low”, however it 
reflects consumers’ (insufficient) willingness to pay 
for high(er) quality. Everybody would like to have 
high quality – but only few are willing to pay for it. 
Quality to some extent has public good character 
– and might be considered for government regula-
tion. The (popular) goal is consumer protection, e.g. 
from low-quality, failing, dangerous products. The 
government could define a minimum standard, rul-
ing out the extreme low quality options. The next 
level of discussion is then this: Who is going to pay? 
Can industry be forced (lower profits) or is paying 
up to the consumer? Both could form a coalition – 
and succeed in shifting the burden on the tax payer 
(the government subsidizes the quality standard). 
3. Imperfect Information and Market Failure
With perfect information (or low search cost) mar-
ket prices would adapt so that they would reflect 
differences in quality offered by companies. Con-
sumers decide according to their individual prefer-
ences on quality-price-combinations. Companies 
will decide on the market segment they want to 
serve. Combinations “low price – low quality” as 
well as “high price – high quality” could be profit-
able and survive in the market. 
With imperfect information there will be a system-
atic difference between the knowledge of companies 
and of consumers (asymmetric information) – and 
companies can exploit their knowledge advantage. 
Akerlof (1970) was the first who analyzed the eco-
nomic consequences of asymmetric information. 
In his simplified model of the used car market he 
assumed that there are only two different qualities: 
good cars and bad cars (= lemons). With perfect 
information two market segments would emerge. 
However, if potential buyers are unable to identify 
good quality, lemon owners will take advantage of 
this and pretend high quality. Akerlof shows that as 
a consequence of imperfect quality information of 
buyers the market for good quality will collapse. Im-
perfectly informed buyers are not willing to pay the 
adequate price for high quality. The market will be 
dominated by over-priced bad cars. However, there 
are solutions to this market failure: 
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• Sellers of good quality cars invest in quality in-
formation, e.g. a certificate from an independent 
expert (signaling). 
• Buyers could increase their search efforts and 
compensate their ignorance e.g. by hiring an ex-
pert (screening). 
So it is possible to overcome the market failure with-
out government intervention. However, it is costly 
for market participants (transaction cost). Govern-
ment regulation could be less costly, e.g. if a mini-
mum of quality information is obligatory. Therefore, 
the decision about the optimal institutional design 
has to include the government option. With this op-
tion however comes the next problem: the regulator 
will always be a target of vested interests (capturing) 
and hence efficient solutions are hard to implement. 
4. Innovation and Obsolescence
As Schumpeter (1911) already pointed out, the core 
process of economic development is innovation3: 
new products displace old solutions in a process of 
“creative destruction”. This process is not a zero sum 
game but creates as a by-product economic growth 
and wealth. Without innovation the economy would 
stagnate (stationary state). In global competition, 
nations – especially nations with high (labor and 
environmental) costs - can prosper only if they are 
superior in innovation. Competition is the driver of 
innovation. In a competitive world, companies and 
nations either innovate or decline. They don’t have 
the option not to participate in the innovation race.4 
All government policy must focus on innovation, 
eliminate barriers to innovation and provide incen-
tives for innovation. This includes tax policy as well 
as energy and education. It also includes environ-
mental and resource policy which could be a barrier 
to innovation. 
Obsolescence is just the other side of the innovation 
coin. New products “destroy” the old ones which 
are outperformed. And although they have no tech-
nical defect, they will be replaced by the new ones. 
The more innovative (and wealthy) an economy 
becomes, the more economic obsolescence acceler-
ates. 
Companies are drivers of the system and are driven 
by the system. They have to invest and to plan in-
novation activity carefully. Once a traditional “cash 
cow” gets old and revenues stagnate, a new (“in-
novative”) product has to be ready for replacing 
it. However, the new product should not come too 
early as it would cannibalize the old one. So com-
panies are interested in planning product lifetime. 
However, they are not in control. In a competitive 
system it is not the individual company which is de-
fining the speed of the innovation process. It is only 
one player and might be forced to accelerate by fast 
competitors.5
Consumer protection policy and institutions have 
an important role to play in this system. It is a reg-
ulative framework that supports the disciplining 
function of competition and government regulation 
and thus increases the acceptance of accelerated in-
novation. It helps to eliminate the worst company 
practices which promise innovation but in fact take 
advantage of consumers’ ignorance. Consumer pro-
tection policy so far does not address the basic ques-
tion of the acceleration spiral: if consumers’ wishes 
and desires get inspired by product innovation, they 
need more income and they have to work more and 
harder. Life dominated by work stimulates compen-
sating consumption (shopping adventure, resorts, 
holidays, alcohol etc.). In this spiral (rat race), life 
satisfaction (happiness) is no longer increasing – al-
though income increases.6
In sum, with the systemic tendency of accelerat-
ing innovation and shorter product life-cycles T is 
more or less irrelevant. Given the immanent long-
term fall of τ it would only be rational that T also de-
clines, in order to avoid economic inefficiency. Why 
construct devices (e.g. mobile phones) for a lifetime 
of ten years if they are actually used for only three 
years and then replaced by a more sophisticated 
new model? If the actual limitation is τ, the ques-
tion is how to influence this factor. Is it just the hu-
man desire for change, improvement, new experi-
ence? What is the consumer’s role in the innovation 
race – driver or driven? Could this role change and 
change the system’s dynamics? These questions are 
part of an increasing sufficiency discussion (Skidel-
sky, Skidelsky, 2012). 
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5. Macroeconomic Aspects: Obsolescence, 
Economic Crisis and Growth 
Accelerated obsolescence has been discussed al-
ready during the world economic crisis in the 1930’s 
as one option to stimulate demand: if consumers 
could be convinced to replace old products by new 
ones, demand, production and employment would 
increase – the Keynesian multiplier effect is started. 
This idea was rediscovered during the economic 
crisis 2008/09 when in many countries (e.g. Ger-
many, France, US) government subsidies for scrap-
ing old cars and replacing them by new cars were 
implemented (Abwrackprämie, cash-for-clunkers, 
car scraping bonus). These programs intended to 
stimulate the automobile industry (OEMs) as well 
as the many (SME) suppliers. As an additional ben-
efit the argument was that the new cars are more 
fuel-efficient than the old ones (i.e. less greenhouse 
gas emissions) and hence contribute to sustainable 
development. 
The economic stimulus effect works – at least tem-
porarily. To start the multiplier this is sufficient even 
if a period of weak demand in the automobile in-
dustry follows. But this specific form of stimulating 
the economy in a crisis seems to be very cost ineffi-
cient (for the US see Gayer, Parker, 2013). Moreover, 
stimulating consumption could support a reduction 
of the saving rate – and thus have a negative effect 
on long-term economic growth. 
A positive net effect for the environmental effect is 
difficult to prove. Many of the cars that have been 
scrapped did not have technical problems and 
could have been used longer. The consequence of 
this government-induced obsolescence was the in-
creasing production of new cars with an increase 
of material (natural resource) consumption and 
increased negative side-effects on all dimensions of 
sustainable development. Therefore, the lower fuel-
consumption of a new car has to be compared to 
these negative effects. If the balance is negative, the 
short-term stimulus is on the cost of future genera-
tions. But this is in the Keynesian tradition: “In the 
long run we are all dead”.
6. Sustainable Development (SD) and Product 
Lifetime
Premature obsolescence contributes to increas-
ing resource consumption, waste and pollution. 
Therefore it is contradicting the fundamental and 
vital goals of sustainable development (SD) which 
have been formulated in global conventions (e.g. 
on climate and biodiversity), national sustainable 
development strategies (e.g. in German Federal 
Government 2012), regional and local sustainabil-
ity agendas (see e.g. New York, http://www.nyc.gov/
html/planyc/html/sustainability). The first question 
which has to be analyzed in more detail is how this 
significant shift in the political goal system is linked 
with product lifetime. If more durable products 
could in fact contribute to sustainable development, 
the next question is whether the market process 
will work and solve this problem or whether gov-
ernment policy is needed. As “sustainable develop-
ment” is a very wide and often vaguely used term, 
it is necessary to provide a general definition first.
Sustainable development is development “which 
meets the needs of the present without compromis-
ing the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs.” (Brundtland Commission, 1987). It in-
cludes environmental, social and economic dimen-
sions. The most comprehensive set of relevant goals 
and targets has now been adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations: the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG). The environmental 
dimension has two core elements: Climate protec-
tion (2° target) and biodiversity. Climate protection 
requires a significant reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHGE) over the next decades. Germany 
is committed to reduce GHGE 80-95 percent by 
2050 (compared to 1990). The protection of global 
biodiversity requires the protection of eco-systems 
and hence the change of land-use patterns. In the 
German national sustainability strategy the goal is 
to reduce land consumption to 30 ha per day by 
2020 (see German Federal Government 2012).
Such limitations of factor input could be a barrier 
to economic growth. Output can continue to grow 
only if “delinking” (decoupling) is successful, i.e. 
GHGE per unit of GDP have to decline continu-
ously (eco-efficiency revolution). Old, inefficient 
products and processes have to be replaced by more 
eco-efficient – from refrigerators to cars and build-
ings. The government can support this with incen-
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tives and subsidies, e.g. cash for clunkers or privi-
leges for electric cars to “modernize” the car fleet 
and delink mobility from climate protection. If the 
eco-efficiency revolution is successful (not compen-
sated by rebound effects), technology in fact takes 
care of the problem and consumers don’t have to 
revise their consumption patterns (e.g. mobility). 
Related to product lifetime the first question now is 
how product lifetime is affecting core goals of Sus-
tainable Development like GHGE or land consump-
tion. There are various approaches for measuring 
the effects of a product throughout the life-cycle 
(life-cycle assessment LCA). However, this analysis 
is costly and not available for many products so far. 
Therefore, it is in fact not yet of practical relevance 
and influence in consumers’ decision making. An al-
ternative would be “correct” prices, i.e. prices which 
also reflect environmental cost. However, this is not 
working because internalization of external effects 
is very hard to implement in the political process. 
A general result of LCA is that new products tend to 
be more eco-efficient and therefore are superior to 
the old ones. However, every new product requires 
additional resource input for production. It is there-
fore always an optimization question: What is the 
optimal lifetime of a product?7 Even in a SD context 
a shorter lifetime is not per se negative. 
The tendency of declining product life-cycles could 
be compatible with SD under two conditions: 
• Old products are reused or recycled with increas-
ing efficiency. In a circular economy with zero 
waste, old products are just the resources for pro-
ducing the new ones (cradle to cradle idea).
• To organize such a process and to drive the circu-
lar economy, it needs (more) energy and land. The 
energy has to be climate neutral, i.e. from renew-
able resources. In a SD strategy no additional land 
is available (as biodiversity needs eco-systems) 
for a circular economy. 
The conditions of such a vision will not be fulfilled 
in the near future. Therefore the accelerating prod-
uct innovation in fact creates “unsustainable in-
novation”.8 It is a good general diagnosis that the 
declining lifetime is contradicting SD – and mecha-
nisms to reduce or revise this tendency should be 
implemented. Based on a broad social consensus on 
SD such mechanisms could be changes in consum-
ers’ behavior (demand for “sustainable” products) 
and/or changes in the business sector (corporate 
social responsibility). If the private sector is unlikely 
to bring about the necessary change processes, we 
have to analyze government options. 
If we focus on the role of consumers, the crucial 
question is whether there is an additional willing-
ness to pay for more sustainable products or if it 
could be stimulated. In fact there is some empirical 
evidence for higher willingness to pay for sustain-
able products (especially related to nutrition and 
health) but only small segments of the market and 
small consumer groups are affected (e.g. LOHAS). 
For mass markets purchasing price remains the 
dominant decision making criterium; more enligh-
tened consumers rely on „total cost of ownership“, 
including cost in the operation period e.g. of a ref-
rigerator. Social cost play no significant role. Freeri-
ders learn to live with “cognitive dissonance“. Only 
if prices included social cost, i.e. if resource-inten-
sive short-time products  became more expensive, 
consumers would react. However, this could have 
negative distributional consequences (energy po-
verty, mobility poverty etc.). 
Would companies change quality decisions if more 
reliable information on product sustainability were 
available? Many companies are committed to SD 
and emphasize Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR). Companies respond it they find consu-
mer groups with a higher willingness to pay for 
high-quality (long-life) products. They also react 
if investors and capital markets want to see a bro-
ader understanding of risk management including 
e.g. environmental and resource scarcity aspects. 
A more pro-active role beyond this is unrealistic 
and so far the domain of some pioneers (often fa-
mily-owned companies) with limited success in 
niche markets. In sum, we cannot expect that the 
business sector will be the driver for a more sus-
tainable social product portfolio. Changes in the 
regulatory framework are necessary to make re-
pair-friendly products, recycling, „cradle-to-cradle“ 
(design thinking) a more profitable option.9
In sum, it is not realistic to expect that market play-
ers – either consumers or companies – will volun-
tarily support a longer product lifetime. 
Rudi Kurz: Quality, obsolescence and unsustainable innovation
God. XXVIII, BR. 2/2015. str. 511-522
517
UDK: 339.138  / Review article
7. Conclusions and Perspectives, Gaps and 
Further Research
Before we discuss in the final step of our analysis the 
role of government policy in the context of product 
quality, product lifetime and sustainable products, 
it has to be reemphasized that there is a lack of 
empirical evidence. So the dimension of the dam-
age (costs) of premature obsolescence for consum-
ers and society is not clear. Only if it is significant, 
government activity – which also causes costs and 
damages – can be justified. 
Moreover, we have seen that optimal product life-
time should always be shorter than technically 
possible – to avoid over-engineering which also is 
a waste of economic resources. In many cases, con-
sumers don’t need the most sophisticated product 
(e.g. drill hammer) and the low-quality option cor-
responds with their actual needs. For SD reasons 
government could make this option less attractive 
or even forbid it – causing problems for low-income 
consumers. 
The core problem, however, is asymmetric infor-
mation. It is not possible to eliminate this problem 
completely as producers will always have an advan-
tage and know the quality of their products better 
than any outsider. Asymmetric info could cause 
market failure (market power) and hence justify 
government intervention. This could address com-
panies as well as consumers: 
• To increase consumers’ information level, inde-
pendent institutions could be created and subsi-
dized to test products, create quality labels etc. 
This reduces consumers’ information cost but 
leaves the decision on (high) quality to them. Ba-
sically, this is not paternalistic, not intervening in 
the consumers’ preference structure but support-
ing more “enlightened” decision making. 
• Beyond this traditional type of consumer (pro-
tection) policy, there are extended options which 
could apply some of the insights of Behavioral 
Economics: if decision making would be re-
framed and include total cost of ownership, a 
high-quality product might be more expensive 
today, however, if operating costs are included it 
might be less costly over time. People tend to un-
derestimate future (dis)advantages systematically 
(procrastination) – and therefore tend to buy the 
low-priced product. In order to support the high 
quality product the government could e.g. offer 
subsidized loans. 
Government policy could address companies e.g. 
by defining additional information requirements. 
Companies could be bound to inform consumers 
about the average lifetime of their products – based 
on the result of laboratory tests. Why are companies 
not making voluntarily use of this additional option 
for signaling high quality? The reasons include:
a) Information on product lifetime has to be based 
on valid long-term tests. With ever shorter prod-
uct life-cycles there is not enough time for such 
tests. 
b) Tests cause costs and make products more ex-
pensive – without directly improving product 
quality.
c) Incalculable effects on the behavior of users (in-
cluding moral hazard, i.e. less careful use). 
If government regulation were to request such infor-
mation, it would also have to install control mecha-
nisms and this would cause additional bureaucracy 
and cost. The overall result would be inefficiency 
and lack of effectiveness. Information in general has 
little direct effect on behavioral changes. Consum-
ers are used to life with cognitive dissonance. Com-
panies will invest in counter information to neutral-
ize the public transparency policy. 
As information instruments will have only very 
limited effects, we have to consider also additional 
monetary incentives and regulations. Monetary 
incentives could address inputs (e.g. taxes on fos-
sil fuels or natural resource extraction) and/or the 
end of the product lifecycle (recycling or disposal 
cost). If disposal taxes or fees are very general (iden-
tical for e.g. all washing machines) and not address-
ing specific product quality, they will in fact cross-
subsidize short-time products. Regulation could 
define a minimum lifetime (or extended warranty) 
for each product or for product groups (washing 
machines, refrigerators etc.). This kind of regulation 
would eliminate low-quality-low-price products 
from the market. The government would no longer 
allow consumers to make the decision but act in 
their best interest (paternalistic). This would cause 
welfare losses. In addition, this would cause nega-
tive distributional effects because the burden of this 
policy is more on low-income households than on 
richer ones. 
Nevertheless, extending product lifetime could be 
an important policy instrument if it would clearly 
support SD goals. However, it depends: “long-life” 
is not identical with “sustainable”. In the context of 
God. XXVIII, BR. 2/2015. str. 511-522
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a sustainability strategy, longevity is not a reliable 
sub-goal. Complex LCA is necessary to evaluate 
potential alternatives. Picking the relevant alterna-
tives is already value driven and based on limited 
knowledge. What creative response will emerge if 
dissatisfaction with premature obsolescence be-
comes overwhelming cannot be predicted. It would 
therefore not be a good idea to focus SD policy on 
characteristics of the end product – unless they are 
really dangerous or hazardous. Rather, SD policy 
should focus on input factors and correct the price 
of these factors (internalizing of social costs). If crit-
ical input factors become more expensive, market 
processes will enforce a more efficient use of prod-
uct – including longer lifetime. 
In the next step we analyze policy options for the 
case that premature obsolescence is based on inno-
vation competition – and on consumers’ preference 
for novelty. Consumers expect, and competition 
drives companies to provide a steady flow of new 
products with improved technological features or 
simply perceived as more “attractive”. In this case, 
premature obsolescence is a pure economic phe-
nomenon; technology plays only a minor role. Some 
of the consequences and implications of this diag-
nosis would be: 
• A new type of consumer policy has to cover a 
much broader scope – not just support market 
transparency for higher product quality. It has to 
include more fundamental aspects of consumer-
ism, e.g. decision making stress as a consequence 
of the exploding number of consumption options, 
the dilemma of the pursuit of happiness if based 
on status consumption, the tyranny of (failing, 
malfunctioning) “things” that tend to consume 
lifetime.10
• The role of companies has to change significantly. 
In the context of the debate on CSR and sustain-
able company strategies, a search process has al-
ready started. Pioneers use LCA, calculate the so-
cial cost of their activities, develop new business 
models beyond quantitative growth (service-ori-
ented) and encourage their customers to critical-
ly reflect their buying decisions (e.g. Patagonia’s 
“Don’t buy this jacket”).
• The government should focus on correcting mar-
ket prices (internalization) by Pigou-taxes e.g. 
on CO2-emissions and on resource extraction. 
Non-sustainable products would become more 
expensive and this would change consumers’ de-
cisions. Prices can then fulfill their indicator and 
rationing function. Companies will change the di-
rection of their innovation activity. “Creative de-
struction” will be harnessed for eco-innovation. 
However, such a causal therapy faces fierce re-
sistance from well-organized interest groups and 
therefore it might be necessary to rely in addition 
on some relatively easy-to-implement regulation 
measures like extended warranty time. Given the 
limitation of government policy, the activity of 
civil society organizations (CSO) becomes more 
important (see e.g. WBGU 2011).
To sum up, from an economic perspective we 
should be careful with the diagnosis of premature 
obsolescence. To some extent it could be quite ra-
tional and even sustainable. It reflects consumers’ 
need and limited willingness to pay. To some extent, 
it is the result of asymmetric information and some 
companies may try to exploit consumers. However, 
competition is a strong counterforce and some gov-
ernment regulations (information, warranty) could 
improve market results. Under a SD perspective the 
answer is significantly different, especially the role 
of government is potentially more important. It has 
to change the framework conditions for decision 
making – and this will change the (optimal) lifetime 
of products. So, the obsolescence debate reempha-
sizes what is already well-known from the debates 
on environmental protection and SD. 
The debate on premature obsolescence is an impor-
tant one, as it also opens the gate for much broader 
and more fundamental questions on consumption. 
These have been discussed in earlier times with dif-
ferent emphasis (Glickman, 1999). However, a new 
dimension is added in the context of SD (Schneide-
wind, Zahrnt, 2013: If the promise of an efficiency 
revolution and of green growth is not materializing, 
there is no other option than to rethink lifestyles 
and consumption patterns of the rich. The ever in-
creasing flow of new products, designed to die early 
will not be supported be the eco-systems of a lim-
ited planet. Sustainable consumer policy therefore 
has to be more than a lawyer for the affluent and has 
to contribute to the enlightenment of consumers in 
the basic Kantian sense of “Ausgang aus ihrer selbst-
verschuldeten Unmündigkeit” (end of self-inflicted 
immaturity). 
Rudi Kurz: Quality, obsolescence and unsustainable innovation
God. XXVIII, BR. 2/2015. str. 511-522
519
UDK: 339.138  / Review article
For the disappointed consumer this raises a couple 
of unpleasant practical questions and options: 
1. Before any purchasing decision, always check the 
“zero-option” first: Do you really need this new 
gadget (electric toothbrush etc.)?11 A household 
which owns 10,000 “things” faces a high prob-
ability that at any given time at least one is not 
functioning properly, even if each of them has a 
very low probability to fail. Therefore, things do 
not only add utility but each of them is also a po-
tential “Zeitdieb” (thief of time), stressing your 
attention and your time-budget (Rosa, 2005).
2. Before buying, check sharing options (with your 
neighbors or professional service providers). Of-
ten you are interested just in using, not in per-
manent ownership (from drilling machines to 
cars). 
3. When you want high quality (long lifetime), this 
normally has a higher price. However, over the 
lifespan it could be a good investment. 
4. If you are victim of a product with premature 
obsolescence, inform and fight (in courts) with 
the producer/seller. Not to buy again (“exit”) is 
a weak signal but “voice” could support learning 
processes more effectively. “Voice” is made easi-
er by internet platforms like http://www.murks-
nein-danke.de.
5. If you are often a victim and think there is a sys-
tematic company policy, engage in the political 
process to change laws and regulations. 
All of these options are time-consuming and hence 
costly. If high quality does not materialize as a result 
of spontaneous market reactions, there is no alter-
native to some form of private investments in over-
coming the market failure. 
Premature and accelerating obsolescence is also a 
challenge for the economic theory. First of all, in-
vestment in more empirical investigations is nec-
essary to better understand the dimension of the 
problem and main causes (e.g. technical vs. eco-
nomic obsolescence). Then an integrated theory of 
the components outlined here would be necessary 
with a critical view on (unsustainable) innovation 
and on the formation of consumers’ preferences. 
A third field of research is the systematic analysis 
of efficiency and effectiveness of alternative insti-
tutional settings and instruments for reducing pre-
mature obsolescence (information requirements, 
regulations on minimum lifetime, subsidization of 
repair cafés, resource taxation etc.). Finally, if inno-
vation activity and consumers’ lifestyles change in a 
more sustainable direction, this will have significant 
impacts on economic (de-)growth which need to be 
analyzed. If we understand the obsolescence debate 
not just as addressing a minor technical problem of 
some irresponsible suppliers, but rather as a con-
sequence of the core process of a market economy, 
further research challenges are unlimited.
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(Endnotes)
1 In the management literature we find some more detailed approaches to the obsolescence problem – not only addressing potential 
(additional) revenues but also risks and costs if a critical part or component of a product fails (see e.g. Bartels et al., 2012).
2 See e.g. Gossen’s Laws: Every additional unit has an additional benefit however this marginal benefit is declining.
3 The concept of innovation, “carrying out new combinations” includes product, process and organizational innovations Schumpeter 
(1934: 66) defines product innovation: “The introduction of a new product – that is one with which consumers are not yet familiar – 
or of a new quality of a good.” In a competitive economy “new combinations mean the competitive elimination of the old.” (Schum-
peter, 1934: 67).
4 A broad literature addresses the question whether ethical responsibility of entrepreneurial individuals and companies could modera-
te and modify the systems dynamic (see e.g. Guiltinan, 2009).
5 Even if one company would plan a long product lifetime (e.g. for black and white TVs), competition from innovators (color TV) would 
destroy this individual plan.
6 Keynes (1930) formulated the idea that with a given consumption level it would be possible to reduce weekly work to just 15 hours 
within a century – if all productivity increases are used for reducing working hours instead of increasing income (and consumption).
7 Example: An aluminium coach for a car has more negative environmental effects than a conventional steel car body in the producti-
on process. However, during the consumption period it is more fuel efficient because the cars have less weight. Aluminium is more 
sustainable only if the car has a longer lifetime respectively is driven more kilometers.
8 Product innovation is the driver; process innovation (higher efficiency, lower costs) is supportive for diffusion. If product innovation 
(related with high resource consumption) becomes dominating, it will tend to overcompensate the (resource-)efficiency gains in the 
production process. „Innovation“ than contradicts „SD“ – type and direction of innovation has to be changed.
9 As long as material and disposal costs are low, but labor costs are high, labor-intensive repair activity is not an attractive option.
10 The popular debate on premature obsolescence to some extent is just a reflection of the general overburdening of (abundant) 
consumers. Conventional consumer policy cannot “cure” this disease. Instead of support for fulfilling given consumer preferences, 
analysis and debate on the creation of preferences is necessary.
11 In some cases companies provide support: „Don’t buy this jacket” (http://www.patagonia. com/email/11/112811.html).
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Kvaliteta, zastarijevanje i neodrživo inoviranje
Sažetak
Netransparentnost kvalitete proizvoda, a osobito njihova životnoga vijeka, jedna je od negativnih popratnih 
pojava potrošačkoga društva i sve većega broja potrošačkih dobara koji su na raspolaganju prosječnomu 
kućanstvu. Brojni su primjeri neuspješnih proizvoda ili preuranjenoga zastarijevanja. Ta je pojava pov-
ezana s poslovnim strategijama povećavanja profita (planirano zastarijevanje) pa je mobilizirana politi-
ka zaštite potrošača kako bi se zaustavila ta vrsta iskorištavanja. U radu se, na temelju mikroekonomske 
analize, obrađuje pitanje optimalne kvalitete proizvoda (npr. životni vijek) u okviru cost-benefit analize 
(analize troškova i koristi) u uvjetima nesavršenih informacija (ovo se temelji na Akerlofovom problemu 
tržišta limuna). S obzirom na to koliko su potrošači spremni platiti, postoji optimalna kvaliteta koja je 
niža od one koja je tehnički moguća. Ako se analizi doda inovacijska perspektiva (Schumpeterovo „krea-
tivno uništavanje”), rastuće globalno tržišno natjecanje i brzina inoviranja proizvoda, glavni su uzroci 
kraćih životnih ciklusa proizvoda  te su često stvarni ograničavajući čimbenik životnoga vijeka proizvoda 
(ekonomsko zastarijevanje nasuprot tehničkome). Čak i kad se u analizu uključe ciljevi održivoga razvoja, 
ne dobivamo jednoznačan argument za dugotrajne proizvode s obzirom na činjenicu da su novi proizvodi 
uglavnom ekološki učinkovitiji. Potrebna je šira rasprava o optimalnoj kvaliteti, odnosno životnome vijeku 
proizvoda, na temelju holističke procjene životnog ciklusa alternativnih mogućnosti u pogledu kvalitete 
proizvoda. Konačno, sve raširenije razočaranje kupaca nakon kupovine s obzirom na njihova očekivanja te 
sukobljenost s ciljevima održivoga razvoja trebaju se obraditi u općoj raspravi o konzumerizmu i njegovim 
granicama. Ograničene izmjene zakona o zaštiti potrošača (npr. produženo jamstvo) neće biti dovoljne. 
Ključne riječi: zastarijevanje, inovacije, natjecanje u kvaliteti, nesavršene informacije, održivi razvoj, anal-
iza životnoga ciklusa
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